On meaning
The action to intend
Caption: On the vertiginous face of the real, the climber’s outstretched hand and upward gaze enact the oldest verb of meaning: to intend. This is not a symbol but the gesture itself—meaning as a vector of action toward a summit both physical and conceptual, a dynamic ascent into the possible, conjured by Nano Banana.
Introduction
What if meaning isn't something we find or create, but something we are? The perennial human quest for meaning has typically treated it as a linguistic puzzle or a psychological project. This article challenges that confined view, proposing instead that meaning is an ontological force—the intrinsic directionality woven into the very fabric of existence.
The philosophical scene has long been dominated by approaches that center on human consciousness. From the existentialist's defiant creation of value in an absurd world to the analytic philosopher's dissection of language, meaning is treated as a problem for minds. This framing, however, leaves a crucial gap: it struggles to connect the human experience of meaning with the apparent purposefulness observed in biology, physics, and complex systems.
By shifting our lens from the human to the ontological, we can develop a unified understanding. This framework posits meaning not as a secondary interpretation but as a primary aspect of being, offering a coherent account of why meaning feels so fundamental to our existence and appears to be a universal principle.
Classical positions
Ancient and theological foundations: Meaning as cosmic order
The earliest systematic philosophies located meaning not within the individual, but within a transcendent and ordered cosmos. For Plato, true sense could only be revealed through the philosopher's apprehension of the perfect, eternal Forms—archetypal constructs located in the realm of abstracta.[1] The fleeting objects of our world possess only a derived significance, a shadowy participation in these ideal archetypes.[2] Plato was haunted by a question: How can a world of constant change produce knowledge that feels eternal?[3] His answer was that sense is a kind of remembrance of a truth beyond the senses.[4]
Aristotle brought Plato's soaring Forms back to earth, anchoring them in the nature of things themselves. For Aristotle, meaning was inextricably linked to telos: 'the ultimate purpose or end for which a thing exists'. An acorn's meaning is found in its potential to become an oak tree; a knife's meaning is to cut. Here, purpose is not imposed from a separate realm but is the inherent actuality toward which every being strives.[5]
Medieval Scholasticism synthesized this Greek framework with Christian theology. The ultimate source and end of all meaning became God. The meaning of creation and human life was to know, love, and return to this divine source. In this grand hierarchy of being, every entity had a designated place and purpose, its meaning flowing from its relationship to the Creator.
The modern turn: Meaning as a human project
The Enlightenment and the scientific revolution began to dismantle this cosmic order. With the proclamation by Nietzsche of the 'death of God', the transcendent guarantor of meaning vanished.[6] The scene shifted dramatically inward. For existentialists like Sartre and Camus, existence precedes essence; we are 'condemned to be free' in a universe devoid of intrinsic purpose.[7] Meaning is no longer discovered—it must be courageously, and often absurdly, created by the individual.[8]
Concurrently, the Analytic or Linguistic Turn sought to dissolve the problem altogether by reframing it. Thinkers like Frege and Wittgenstein argued that meaning is not a metaphysical mystery but a function of language.[9] It is found in the use of a word within a specific 'language-game' or in the relationship between a sign and its reference.[10] From this vantage, the grand question 'What is the meaning of life?' is often treated as a nonsensical confusion of grammar, a pseudo-problem to be clarified rather than answered.[11]
Postmodern and contemporary fragmentation: Meaning as construct and effect
The 20th century further fragmented the concept. Post-structuralists like Derrida and Foucault argued that meaning is never stable or final. It is perpetually deferred (différance) and is produced by, and enmeshed in, structures of power, history, and discourse.[12] There is no 'true' meaning to uncover, only interpretations vying for dominance.
Meanwhile, Cognitive Science and Naturalism launched a different kind of assault, attempting to reduce meaning to its physical correlates. Meaning became an emergent property of complex biological systems—a computational state of the brain or an evolutionary adaptation that enhanced survival. The profound human feeling of significance was, in this view, a sophisticated epiphenomenon of neural processes.[13]
Current flashpoints
This historical journey has left contemporary thought with several unresolved tensions, or flashpoints, where the nature of meaning is fiercely debated.
The most poignant is The Hard Problem of Meaning. This mirrors the hard problem of consciousness: how do subjective, qualitative experiences of meaning—what it feels like for something to matter—arise from objective, physical processes in the brain? A scientific description of neural activity seems incapable of capturing the raw, felt significance of a loved one's touch or a profound idea.
This leads directly to the debate over the Scope of Meaning. Is meaning the exclusive property of conscious, language-using agents? Or can we legitimately speak of meaning in pre-linguistic, non-human, or even non-biological systems? Does a gene 'mean' to replicate? Does an ecosystem 'seek' equilibrium? Our answer to this question dictates whether meaning is a rare anomaly in the cosmos or a ubiquitous feature.
Underpinning these debates is the fundamental divide between Realism vs. Anti-Realism about Meaning. Is meaning something we discover in the structure of the world (realism), or is it something we project onto a silent, indifferent universe (anti-realism)? Does the universe have a purpose, or is purpose a human invention?
Finally, there is the problem of The Normativity of Meaning. If meaning is constructed by us or is merely a natural phenomenon, what grounds its normative force? Why should we adhere to one meaning or purpose over another? If all meanings are equally valid constructs, the concept of meaning itself threatens to become vacuous.
How the Gospel of Being sees meaning
The Gospel of Being offers a radical reframing that seeks to resolve these flashpoints by returning meaning to its ontological roots. In this framework, meaning is not primarily about interpretation or language but about intention. It is the directional vector of existence itself.
The core proposition is that every being, in its very 'action to be', is an 'action to intend'.[14] Meaning is not a secondary quality but is co-extensive with being. This intention is universally aimed toward a single goal: the accumulation of power. Crucially, power is understood not as domination, but as ability, capacity, and potential to act and adapt.[15] This is a universal, non-conditional purpose shared by everything that exists.
While the purpose is universal, the specific meaning of any being is conditional and adaptive. It is shaped by its context, its relations, and what can be termed the 'regulatory actions of others'.[16] The meaning of a CEO is expressed through corporate strategy, while the meaning of a parent is expressed through nurturing care. Both are different, context-dependent expressions of the same universal arc toward accumulating ability.
This framework insists that meaning is inherently relational. It is not a private, internal state but is always sent—'caused to go'—so that it may be sensed or 'transduced' by another.[17] Meaning exists in the dynamic, relational loop between intention and reception.
From this, a new understanding of consciousness emerges. Consciousness is not meaning's source, but its most refined instrument. It arises as a 'measure of knowing together', a state of high-fidelity alignment where the meaning sent and the sense received are one within the 'conference of difference'.[18] It is the pinnacle of successful transduction.
The ultimate criterion for meaning is therefore probability—'that which is able to prove'.[19] A meaning only 'makes sense' if it can successfully cross the gap between beings. Its ontological fitness depends on its probability of being accurately transduced by a receiver's existing structures. This is the final circuit breaker: meaning is not what we say, but what successfully goes.
Convergence and divergence
This ontological view of meaning creates fascinating points of convergence and divergence with classical positions.
It converges with Aristotle in seeing purpose as inherent to being. Both frameworks are teleological at their core. However, the Gospel diverges by defining the telos in universal, non-transcendent terms—the accumulation of ability—and by grounding its realization entirely in immanent, relational processes, the constant negotiation of the 'conference of difference'.
It converges with Existentialism in its emphasis on action, potency, and meaning as a project of becoming. The sense of a vital, active force is shared. Yet, it diverges radically by asserting that meaning is not a human creation in the face of absurdity, but a fundamental, cosmic grammar that precedes and includes human existence. We do not create meaning ex nihilo; we participate in and channel a meaning that is already underway.
It converges with Naturalism in its ambition to provide a coherent, naturalistic account that applies to all systems, from the physical to the social. The Gospel diverges, however, by refusing reductionism. It posits meaning as a real, irreducible ontological category—intention—that is foundational, not emergent. It is metaphysically grounded in the perpetual expression of the Conference of Difference ${\Delta}$.[20]
Finally, it presents a total divergence from the Linguistic Analysis tradition. The Gospel fundamentally rejects the confinement of meaning to language. It argues that language is but one medium—albeit a powerful one—for a much more fundamental, pre-linguistic process of ontological intending and transducing that governs everything from particles and plants to persons and planets.
Take-away
The philosophical take-away is profound: meaning is not a secondary, human-centric feature of the world but a primary, ontological force. It is the 'action to intend' that is co-extensive with being itself. This provides a unified framework to understand directionality and purpose across physics, biology, psychology, and sociology, effectively resolving the flashpoint about the 'scope of meaning'. The hard problem softens when we see consciousness not as the generator of meaning, but as its most sophisticated transducer.
For us, the human take-away is transformative. Our personal, often anxious search for meaning is not a lonely quest in a silent universe. It is our conscious participation in a fundamental, cosmic dynamic. We are inherently meaning-making beings because we are meaning-intending beings. This shifts the fundamental question from 'What is the meaning of life?' to 'How can I best align my intentions with the universal purpose of accumulating ability—for myself and others—through the harmonious conference of difference?' The path to a meaningful life is found in fostering relationships and systems where what we intend is what is truly sensed and received, thereby creating a world of greater shared power, capacity, and connection.[21]
The Gospel of Being
by John Mackay
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Discover the bookFootnotes
Plato introduces what later scholarship calls the 'Forms' in the Phaedo not as a formal metaphysical proposition, but through labels such as 'absolute beauty', 'beauty itself', and 'essence' to denote ideal, eternal realities apprehended by reason alone. Plato. (1997). Republic, Book VI in Complete works (J. M. Cooper, Ed.). Hackett Publishing. Hackett Publishing. ↩︎
see Plato's Allegory of the Cave in Plato. (1997). Republic, Book VII in Complete works (J. M. Cooper, Ed.). Hackett Publishing. ↩︎
Plato's epistemology and metaphysics are founded in this tension between flux and permanence. ↩︎
see Plato's Doctrine of Recollection (anamnesis) in Phaedo in Plato. (1997). Complete works (J. M. Cooper, Ed.). Hackett Publishing. ↩︎
Aristotle. (1984). Physics, Book II, Section 7. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton University Press. (Original work published c. 350 B.C.E.) ↩︎
Nietzsche, F. (2001). The gay science (J. Nauckhoff, Trans.; Ed. by B. Williams). Book Five. Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1882/1887). ↩︎
Sartre, J.-P. (1946). Existentialism is a humanism (P. Mairet, Trans.). Marxists Internet Archive. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm ↩︎
Camberlain, C. (2023, August 23). Albert Camus. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/camus/#ParCamAbs ↩︎
Zalta, E. N. (2022, August 15). Gottlob Frege. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ ↩︎
Biletzki, A., & Matar, A. (2021, November 2). Ludwig Wittgenstein. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition). Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/ ↩︎
This view is advanced in Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly through what his interpreters call his Private Language Argument (PLA) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#RuleFollPrivLang. Wittgenstein apparently argues that a language understandable only to a single individual—referring purely to private, inner sensations like 'my personal sense of meaning'—is impossible. For a word to have a rule-governed use (and thus meaning), it must be anchored in publicly shareable criteria and forms of life. The question 'What is the meaning of life'? often presupposes that 'meaning' is a singular, private entity to be discovered within consciousness. The PLA suggests this is a grammatical illusion: if 'meaning' is divorced from public language-games and practices, it becomes a word without a use, a signifier pointing to nothing verifiable. Thus, the question isn't answered but dissolved by examining the conditions for meaningful discourse itself. ↩︎
Derrida introduced the concept of différance—a play on the French words différer (to differ and to defer). This term captures the dual idea that meaning arises through difference between signs and is perpetually deferred, never fully present. ↩︎
Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. MIT Press. https://archive.org/details/neurophilosophyt0000chur ↩︎
Gospel of Being: ready reference Koan 60.1and Koan 60.6 ↩︎
Gospel of Being: ready reference Koan 60.2, Koan 60.6 ↩︎
This article integrates insight from the following source(s): DeepSeek-R1. ↩︎