John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308)

A comparative analysis with the CoD

A satirical depiction of the Renaissance humanist critique of Scotus: John Colet, Desiderius Erasmus, and Philip Melanchthon throw paper at John Duns Scotus, who is forced to wear a 'dunce cap' – a term derived from his followers ('Dunses'). The image mocks the accusers' childishness, not Scotus himself. Courtesy of Nano Banana.

I. Abstract

The core ontological claim of John Duns Scotus’s metaphysics is the univocity of being, which posits that the concept of 'being' is predicated in a single, identical sense of both God and creatures, differing only in the modal intensity of their existence. The OMAF reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity, highlighting the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground relationality as the primitive process of existence, without requiring a prior, common formal ground. Where Scotus seeks a common conceptual foundation for unity, the CoD posits that unity is always a provisional achievement of dynamic difference-bearing. This section demonstrates how the CoD offers a process-oriented alternative to Scotus’s conceptual resolution of the one-and-many problem, thereby contributing to the thesis that the CoD provides a uniquely dynamic and relational foundation for ontology.

II. Overview of Scotist metaphysics

John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308), the 'Subtle Doctor,'' developed a sophisticated metaphysical system in the high medieval period, primarily in reaction to the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis. His central principle is the univocity of being (univocatio entis), which asserts that the term ‘being’ (or ‘that which is’) signifies a single, common concept applicable to both the infinite being of God and the finite being of creatures.^[1] This commonality is not in actual existence but in the formal concept, allowing for a metaphysics that can rationally discourse about God without collapsing into pure analogy or equivocation. This leads to his doctrine of the formal distinction—a distinction a parte rei (on the part of the thing) that is intermediate between a merely rational distinction and a real distinction. This is most famously applied to the divine attributes and, crucially for ontology, to the distinction between a thing’s common nature (e.g., its ‘horseness’) and its individuating principle, the ‘thisness’ or haecceity.

In John Duns Scotus: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

• Primacy-of-existence: being as a univocal concept is primary, logically prior to any determinations;
• Manner-of-existence: finite beings are characterized by their formal natures, which are then contracted to actual existence by a principle of individuation;
• Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: the common nature provides the universal, unifying aspect, while haecceity accounts for the irreducible multiplicity of individual entities.

The unity of the conceptual realm (the univocal concept of being) is the precondition for understanding the multiplicity of real, individuated beings.

III. Overview of the CoD

The CoD model claims that as a 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. The CoD model claims further that this process of declaring together can itself be described as a conference of difference, i.e. a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Hence the CoD model claims that the conference of difference is the process primitive of existence and thus irreducible in and of itself. For instance, whether we infer the condition of an elementary particle as a discrete corpuscle, a quantum wave packet, or an excitation of a field, each conceptualization is, in itself, a conference of difference. The fundamental implication is that the 'conference of difference' is not a property of any single physical theory, but a constitutive pattern of existence itself—one through which every abstracta (construct) is revealed and every existent transforms.

IV. Comparison

Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence

• Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a foundational divergence on what is ontologically primary.
• Scotus's Position: For Scotus, the univocal concept of being is primary. It is the single, formal concept that must be understood before any further metaphysical distinctions (like infinite/finite, substance/accident) can be made. Existence is an instantiation of this prior conceptual unity.^[2]
• CoD's Position: The CoD inverts this priority. It claims that the primary reality is not a concept but the active process of the conference of difference—the dynamic "declaring together of action to be." Existence is not the instantiation of a formal concept but is identical to this ongoing, relational process.
• Interpretive Analysis: This difference is not merely technical but foundational. Where Scotus posits a formal, conceptual unity as the ground for all ontology, the CoD's insistence on a dynamic process allows it to account for perpetual flux and becoming as the very substance of reality, phenomena that a conceptually anchored model must treat as secondary modifications of being.

Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence

• Statement: The models offer contrasting accounts of how any specific being exists.
• Scotus's Position: A being's manner-of-existence is defined by its formal nature, which is subsequently individuated by haecceity. A thing is what it is by virtue of its nature, and it is this particular thing by virtue of its individuating principle. Existence is the actualization of this pre-defined formal reality.
• CoD's Position: The manner-of-existence for any being is its specific, participatory role in the conference of difference. An entity is not defined by an internal form plus an individuating principle, but by the total set of its dynamic relations. Its "being" is its "action to be" within the relational network.^[3]
• Interpretive Analysis: Scotus provides a static architecture for identity, whereas the CoD presents a dynamic, ecological one. The CoD’s framework can more naturally accommodate emergent properties and identity change, as an entity’s "nature" is not fixed but is a continuously negotiated outcome of its conferences.

Criterion 3: Relationship-Between-Multiplicity-and-Unity

• Statement: The most significant divergence occurs in how the models reconcile the one and the many.
• Scotus's Position: Unity is logically and conceptually prior. The univocal concept of being is the one, common ground that allows us to speak meaningfully about the many different beings. Multiplicity is introduced through the addition of a contracting principle (haecceity) to the common nature.
• CoD's Position: The relationship is reversed and processual. Multiplicity (the "bearing apart" of difference) is the raw material, and unity (the "bearing together") is a temporary, achieved state within the ongoing conference. There is no prior unity, only the perpetual process of uniting.^[4]
• Interpretive Analysis: This is the conceptual leap that changes everything. Scotus’s model is a top-down solution, seeking a common conceptual foundation to guarantee unity. The CoD offers a bottom-up, emergent solution where unity is not a precondition but a result. This allows the CoD to ground relationality without a prior unity, presenting a world where togetherness is an active verb, not a shared noun. This is a meaningful convergence in that both models grapple intensely with the same philosophical problem, but their solutions point to fundamentally different worlds: one of conceptual harmony, the other of processual negotiation.

V. Implications

The central philosophical lesson from this comparison is that the CoD’s process-oriented ontology provides a robust alternative to the architectonic of common natures and formal distinctions. The confrontation with Scotus throws the CoD's commitment to dynamic, bottom-up relationality into sharpest relief, demonstrating that an ontology can be grounded and coherent without being monistic in a conceptual or formal sense.

This comparison strengthens the case for the CoD by showing how it solves a core problem that Scotus addressed with considerable, yet arguably static, complexity: the problem of individuation. For Scotus, individuation requires a unique, positive principle (haecceity). For the CoD, individuality is not a principle added to a common nature but is the intrinsic, unique perspective of a particular node within the relational network of the conference of difference. This reframes individuality not as a metaphysical singularity but as a unique locus of relation, opening a new line of inquiry into identity as a process rather than a state.

The CoD thus offers not merely an alternative to Scotist univocity but a complete theological-ontological reorientation. If the conference of difference is the constant, irreducible process of creating and transforming all existence—perfect, unchanging in itself, causing all change—then it satisfies the classical divine attributes of omnipotence (enabling of everything), omniscience (realizing of everything), and omnipresence (caused to go before everything). To say 'the conference of difference is God' is to name the creative function truly, without claiming to exhaust the apophatic mystery of whatever God might be beyond that function. Scotus sought a univocal concept of being to ground rational theology; the CoD offers instead a univocal process—the conference of difference—as the very substance of the Creator's constant expression.

The Gospel of Being

by John Mackay

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