René Descartes (1641)
A comparative analysis with the CoD
A satirical depiction of the perils of free expression during the Inquisition: René Descartes flees pursuing Catholic clergy, symbolizing his self-imposed exile from France to the Dutch Republic (c. 1628) in search of intellectual refuge. The image highlights the pressures on heterodox thinkers, not an attack on faith itself. Courtesy of DALL·E.
I. Abstract
René Descartes' ontological model posits a foundational dualism, asserting the existence of two distinct and irreducible substances: res cogitans: 'thinking substance' and res extensa: 'extended substance'. As mentioned in Methodology, this comparative assessment employs the Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF) to evaluate this model against the Conference of Difference (CoD). The OMAF reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity, highlighting the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground relationality without a prior, substantial unity. Where Descartes requires God as a guarantor to bridge the chasm between mind and matter, the CoD posits that all entities, whether mental or physical, are co-constituted through their dynamic, differential relations. This section demonstrates how the CoD resolves the problem of interaction inherent in Cartesian dualism, thereby contributing to the overall thesis by showcasing the CoD's explanatory power in addressing a perennial philosophical challenge.
II. Overview of Cartesian Dualism
Emerging from the 17th-century intellectual revolution, René Descartes' philosophy sought to establish an indubitable foundation for knowledge. His method of radical doubt led him to the famous conclusion Cogito, ergo sum: 'I think, therefore I am', establishing the thinking self as the primary certainty. From this, Descartes constructed an ontological model of substance dualism. The core principle is the existence of two fundamentally different kinds of substance: res cogitans, which is unextended, indivisible, and characterized by thought; and res extensa, which is spatially extended, divisible, and operates according to mechanical laws.
In Rene Descartes: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:
- On manner-of-existence: the two substances exist in a static, self-contained manner; mind and body are defined by their essential attributes, not their relations.
- On primacy-of-existence: Descartes grants a certain primacy to the thinking self discovered through the Cogito, but ultimately grounds both substances in the perfection of God, the one substantia in the truest sense. The key mechanism for their interaction—a major point of philosophical contention—was proposed to be the pineal gland, where the immaterial mind could somehow influence the material body.
- On the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: it struggles to coherently explain how two utterly heterogeneous substances can form a unified human experience.
III. Overview of the CoD
The Conference of Difference (CoD) model claims that, as a 'condition of being', existence is a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. This process of declaring together can itself be described as a conference of difference: a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Logically, every conference is of difference as every difference is born of conference.[1] Therefore, the conference of difference is irreducible in and of itself and thus the process primitive of existence. For example:
- whether we infer the condition of an elementary particle as a discrete corpuscle, a quantum wave packet, or an excitation of a field, each conceptualization is, in itself, a bearing together of difference;
- whether we model a solar system as a Newtonian clockwork of gravitating masses, a relativistic curvature of spacetime, or a dissipative structure within a galactic context, each is a bearing together of difference;
- whether we model a thought as a computational algorithm executed by a neural network, a dynamic global pattern in a connectome, or a bioelectric morphogenetic field, each is a bearing together of difference.
The fundamental implication of each of the above examples is that the conference of difference is not a property of any single physical theory, but the constitutive process of existence itself—one through which every abstractum (construct) is revealed and every existent transforms.[2]
IV. Comparison
The OMAF assessment identifies radical divergences between Cartesian Dualism and the CoD, revealing how their foundational starting points lead to profoundly different accounts of reality.
Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence
- Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a fundamental divergence on what is considered the primary reality.
- Cartesian Position: Descartes' model grants primacy to substance—specifically, to the self-certainty of the thinking substance (res cogitans) and the logically necessary existence of God. The material world (res extensa) is secondary, known only through the mediation of the mind and guaranteed by God's veracity.
- CoD's Position: The CoD insists that no single substance or entity is primary. Instead, primacy is granted to the relational process itself—the conference of difference. Existence is not a collection of self-subsisting things but a dynamic process of 'bearing together' and 'bearing apart'.
- Interpretive Analysis: This difference is not merely technical but foundational. Where Descartes posits thinking as the primary ground for being, the CoD's insistence on relational process allows it to account for the mind-body union not as a miraculous interaction, but as a continuous, constitutive conference. The Cartesian model must treat the unified human experience as a problem to be solved, while the CoD sees it as the default state of existence.[3]
Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence
Statement: The models present an irreconcilable contrast regarding the fundamental mode in which things exist.
- Cartesian Position: Substances exist in a static, self-contained manner defined by their essential attributes (thought for mind, extension for matter). Their being is inherent and independent before any relation is considered.
- CoD's Position: The manner-of-existence is inherently dynamic and transformative. A being's 'action to be' is its continuous participation in conferences of difference. Its identity is not fixed but is perpetually negotiated and expressed through relation.
- Interpretive Analysis: Descartes' static substances create a universe of isolated entities, forcing a 'ghost in the machine' model of the self. The CoD, by contrast, presents a universe in constant, graceful flux. Think of it not as a collection of objects, but as a network of relationships. This conceptual leap changes everything, dissolving the hard boundaries between Descartes' two worlds into a single, dynamic field of interaction.[4]
Criterion 3: Relationship-Between-Multiplicity-and-Unity
- Statement: This criterion exposes the most significant philosophical schism, revealing the CoD's capacity to resolve a foundational problem that fractures substance-based ontologies.
- Cartesian Position: Multiplicity (mind vs. body) and unity (the human person) are in profound tension. Unity is not an inherent property of the two substances but must be causally imposed by a third, distinct, and divine entity (God). This external solution to an internal logical problem remains philosophically problematic, as it merely posits a deus ex machina without explaining the mechanism of interaction itself.
- CoD's Position: Multiplicity and unity are not opposed but are co-constitutive poles of a single process. Unity is not a prior state or an externally imposed arrangement, but a continuous, active achievement—the 'bearing together' that is the conference itself. Multiplicity (difference) is not the problem to be solved, but the essential raw material from which this dynamic unity is perpetually forged.
- Interpretive Analysis: The confrontation with Descartes throws the CoD's commitment to immanent relationality into sharpest relief. Where Descartes sees an unbridgeable chasm requiring a transcendent bridge, the CoD sees only the pervasive, ordinary process of conferencing. The CoD is not a third party imposing unity like Descartes' God; it is the name for the unified relational ground itself. It solves the interaction problem not by building a better bridge, but by dissolving it, showing that mind and matter were never separate substances to begin with, but always-already interdependent expressions of the same constitutive process.
V. Implications
The single most important philosophical lesson from this comparison is that substance-based ontology inevitably creates schisms—between mind and body, self and world—that it cannot internally reconcile without appealing to an external, deus ex machina solution. The central insight is that the CoD, by making relational process primary, offers a coherent foundation for a unified reality that does not erase diversity but is, in fact, built from it.
This comparison decisively strengthens the case for the CoD model. It solves the specific, intractable problem of mind-body interaction that has plagued Cartesianism for centuries, not by providing a new mechanism for interaction, but by re-describing the ontological landscape such that the problem cannot arise. The CoD opens a new line of inquiry by suggesting that what we take to be fundamental entities—be they minds, bodies, or particles—are better understood as stable, recurring patterns within a more primordial conference of difference. This moves the philosophical conversation from a static 'what is it?' to a dynamic 'how does it relate?'. If this seems like a mere shift in perspective, you're in good company—but it is a shift that reconfigures the entire philosophical terrain. The CoD demonstrates that an ontology can account for the full spectrum of experience—from the subjective to the physical—without resorting to dualistic fractures or the metaphysical scaffolding required to patch them back together.
The Gospel of Being
by John Mackay
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This is not a causal circle but a constitutive one: neither term precedes the other; each is intelligible only through the other. ↩︎
See Section 4.1 The CoD as a Universal Constant for further detail. ↩︎
Because Descartes’ substance ontology defines mind and body by mutually exclusive essential attributes (thought vs. extension), no internal principle of union is possible; unity must be externally imposed (by God or the pineal gland). Hence unified human experience cannot be primitive—it is a problem to be solved. See Wilson, M. (1978). Descartes; Cottingham, J. (1988). Descartes on the unity of the person. In M. Hooker (Ed.), Descartes: Critical and interpretive essays. ↩︎
The affinity with process philosophy is deliberate but not total. Process thinkers such as Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality, 1929) and Gilles Deleuze (Difference and Repetition, 1968) also prioritize becoming over being and relation over substance. However, the CoD distinguishes itself by rejecting any final 'actual entity' or 'virtual multiplicity' as primitive. For the CoD, the conference of difference is the primitive—neither a subject nor a pre-individual field, but the irreducible 'bearing together of bearing apart'. A comparative analysis of the CoD and Whiteheadian concrescence is beyond this section's scope ↩︎