John Searle (1995)

A comparative analysis with the CoD

I. Abstract

John Searle’s philosophy of mind makes a core ontological claim: conscious states are real, irreducibly subjective, first-person phenomena caused by and realized in the neurobiological processes of the brain. As mentioned in Methodology, this comparative assessment employs the Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF) to juxtapose Searle’s biological naturalism with the Conference of Difference (CoD) model. The OMAF reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of manner-of-existence, highlighting the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground subjective consciousness as a specific, emergent pattern of relational dynamics, rather than a mysterious property of a biological substance. This comparison demonstrates how the CoD reframes the mind-body problem, not by solving it, but by dissolving its underlying ontological assumptions, thereby contributing to the thesis that the CoD offers a more fundamental and versatile ontological primitive.

II. Overview of John Searle's biological naturalism

Emerging in the late 20th century as a response to both dualist and reductive physicalist accounts of the mind, John Searle’s biological naturalism seeks to preserve the undeniable reality of subjective consciousness within a scientifically respectable, natural world. Its core principle is that consciousness is a higher-level, systems-level feature of the brain, causally emergent from and entirely dependent upon specific neurobiological processes. The key mechanism is causal reduction: while mental states are causally reducible to their physical substrate (meaning they have no extra-physical causal power), they are ontologically irreducible because their first-person, qualitative character cannot be captured by third-person physical descriptions.

In the John Searle: a CRUP-OMAF case study, his ontology is assessed as follows:

• Manner-of-existence: consciousness is an irreducibly subjective, real feature of the world.
• Primacy-of-existence: the physical world, particularly the brain, is ontologically primary, as it is the sole cause and realizer of mental life.
• Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: is hierarchical; the unified field of consciousness emerges from the complex, multi-level interaction of billions of neurons.

III. Overview of the CoD

The Conference of Difference (CoD) model claims that, as a 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. This condition: 'process of declaring together' can itself be described as a conference of difference: a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Logically, every conference is of difference as every difference is born of conference. Critically, this is not a causal circle but a constitutive one: neither term precedes the other; each is intelligible only through the other.^[1] Therefore, the conference of difference is irreducible in and of itself and thus the process primitive of existence.

In the Conference of Difference: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

• Primacy-of-existence: The CoD reveals primacy, not in substance of entities but, in the relational process itself: the conference of difference—relation precedes relata. Entities' are discerned as stabilized patterns within this ongoing process. As declared in Koan 10.1, 'all existence is a conference of difference'. Relation is not something that happens between discerned entities but rather the process primitive that transforms existence itself.
• Manner-of-existence: The manner-of-existence is fundamentally conferential and transformative. Thus, being: 'action to be' is a continuous, dynamic process of 'bearing together' and 'bearing apart' – a constant negotiation that defines the 'condition of being' that is existence. 'All existence transforms via binding, not freedom' (Koan 30.7).
• Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: Unity is an immanent and continuous achievement of the conference of difference itself. Koan 80.1 frames this as a universal reciprocity that moves toward equilibrium—a self-organizing principle inherent to existence itself.

IV. Comparison

Criterion 1: Primacy-of-existence

• Statement: Here, the models find a meaningful convergence in their commitment to naturalism, but diverge on what is deemed fundamental.
• Searle's position: Searle is clear on the primacy of the physical world. The brain and its biological processes are ontologically primary. Consciousness, while real, is causally and ontologically secondary, dependent entirely on this physical base.
• CoD's position: The CoD does not grant primacy to the physical, the mental, or any specific substance. Primacy is granted to the process of the conference of difference itself. The physical brain and the conscious mind are both secondary, co-emergent manifestations of this more fundamental ontological process. 'All existence is a conference of difference—Amen'.^[2]
• Interpretive analysis: This is where the CoD demonstrates its radical nature. Both models are naturalistic, but Searle’s naturalism is rooted in 20th-century biology and physics. The CoD’s naturalism is rooted in a pre-substantive ontology of relation. It subsumes Searle’s biological foundation within a broader framework, suggesting that what we call 'the physical' is itself a stable, persistent pattern of the conference. This doesn't invalidate Searle's claims but re-contextualizes them, showing how biological structures can be the seat of consciousness without being its ultimate ontological ground.

Criterion 2: Manner-of-existence

• Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a critical divergence on the fundamental nature of how things exist, particularly regarding consciousness.
• Searle's position: Searle posits a dual manner-of-existence within the natural world. Physical entities exist objectively, while consciousness exists subjectively. This subjective, first-person ontology is what he famously calls the 'ontologically subjective' nature of the mind. It is a real feature of the world, but its mode of existence is irreducibly different from that of mountains and molecules.^[3]
• CoD's position: The CoD posits a single, unified manner-of-existence: the conference of difference. Everything that exists does so as a dynamic pattern of relationality. Subjectivity and objectivity are not different kinds of existence but represent a differing knowledge: 'manner of knowing' informing consciousness: the 'measure of knowing together'.
• Interpretive analysis: This difference is not merely technical but foundational. Where Searle posits a categorical split between objective brain and subjective mind, the CoD's insistence on a single relational process allows it to account for consciousness as a natural and continuous expression of cosmic dynamics, not a miraculous anomaly. The CoD reframes the 'hard problem' from how does the brain produce subjectivity? to how does a specific configuration of the conference of difference manifest as a 'measure of knowing together'?

Criterion 3: Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity

• Statement: The OMAF reveals that both models take the problem of unity and multiplicity seriously, but resolve it in starkly different ways.
• Searle's position: For Searle, the relationship is one of causal emergence. The multiplicity of neuronal firings, when organized in a specific, highly complex way, causally gives rise to a unified, singular field of consciousness. The unity of our experience is a real, non-illusory feature that emerges from the underlying physical multiplicity.
• CoD's position: The CoD posits that unity and multiplicity are co-constitutive and simultaneous. The 'conference' is the bearing-together (unity) of 'difference' (multiplicity). There is no prior unity that then differentiates, nor a pure multiplicity that must be unified. The unified field of consciousness is not an emergent property from a multiplicity of parts, but is the very conference of those differential relations. As the ready-reference states, 'consciousness [is] a 'measure of knowing together'', a specific pattern of the conference in action.^[4]
• Interpretive analysis: Searle’s model provides a scientifically plausible bridge but leaves the 'how' of unification philosophically opaque. The CoD, by making relationality its primitive, builds unity and multiplicity into the fabric of existence from the start. It suggests that the unified self is not a ghostly emergent entity but the experiential texture of a specific, localized conference of vast internal and external differences.

V. Implications

The confrontation with John Searle’s robust and influential framework throws the CoD's commitment to a relational, process-based ontology into sharpest relief. The central philosophical lesson is that the intractable problem of consciousness may stem from our implicit substance-based ontology. Searle heroically tries to fit the square peg of subjective experience into the round hole of a world composed of objective things, leading to an explanatory gap. The CoD, by contrast, proposes that the world is made of relational processes all the way down.

This comparison strengthens the case for the CoD by demonstrating its capacity to dissolve a perennial philosophical problem. It solves the specific issue of the mind-body 'great divide' not by bridging it, but by showing that the two banks of the divide are themselves patterns within a single, relational river. It opens a new line of inquiry, moving us from asking What is consciousness? to How is consciousness conferenced?

Gospel of being

All existence is a conference of
difference

Discover the process

From bosons to the cosmos and beyond.