Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274)
A comparative analysis with the CoD
Three traditions, one tableâAristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Sina, a philosophical conference of difference, rendered in Northern Renaissance style, courtesy of Nano Banana.
I. Abstract
The Thomistic model, articulated by Thomas Aquinas, posits a core ontological claim: all being is grounded in and participates in Actus Purus (Pure Act) â identified as God â from whom all contingent beings derive their existence via creation.The Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF) reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity, highlighting the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground relationality as the process primitive of existence, without requiring a prior, simple unity. Where Thomism begins with a supreme, self-subsistent Being from which all multiplicity flows, the CoD begins with the dynamic, constitutive conference of difference that is reality itself. This comparison underscores the CoD's potential to articulate a metaphysics of inherent, processual relation, offering a novel perspective on the problem of the one and the many.
II. Overview of the Thomistic Model
The ontology of Thomas Aquinas, synthesized in the 13th century by repurposing Avicennian metaphysics within an Aristotelian causal framework for Christian theological ends, presents a hierarchical structure of reality ordered toward God. Its historical context is one of integrating reason and faith, seeking to demonstrate the logical coherence of a created universe sustained by a transcendent God.
The core principle of Thomism is the assumed distinction between essence (what a thing is) and existence (that a thing is) in all contingent beings.[1] It is often assumed that this distinction derives from Aristotle. In fact, it originates with the Persian philosopher Avicenna (Ibn SÄ«nÄ), who first argued that essence is neutral with respect to existence â a what that can be conceived without any that. Aquinas repurposed Avicenna's distinction. Where Avicenna treated existence as an accident added to an essence already possessing esse essentiae (a being-of-essence in the mind), Aquinas rejected this as impossible: an essence without esse is nothing actual. Yet Aquinas retained Avicenna's fundamental move (the real distinction) while replacing the metaphor of 'addition' with that of 'actuation.' For any creature, existence is an act bestowed upon its essence by an external cause.
This leads to the key metaphysical mechanism: a chain of existential causality (causa essendi) that cannot regress infinitely, and therefore must terminate in a first cause â a necessary, uncaused source of all esse: Ipsum Esse Subsistens (Subsistent Being Itself), also described as Actus Purus: utterly simple, immutable, pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality.[2]
In Thomas Aquinas: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:
- Manner-of-existence: created being is act-oriented but fundamentally static in its essence, with change belonging to the realm of accident and potentiality.
- Primacy-of-existence: God as Pure Act is the primary reality, with all else being secondary, participated being.
- Relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: unity is primordial and absolute in God, while multiplicity is a consequence of creation, a falling away from absolute simplicity into a diversity of essences that receive existence in limited, varied ways. The unity of the cosmos is not inherent but derived from its shared, dependent relation to the one Creator.
III. Overview of the CoD
The CoD model claims that as the 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, the 'process of declaring together of action to be'. The CoD model claims further that this process of declaring together is, in functional terms, a conference of difference, symbolized as $\lbrace\Delta\rbrace$ and defined as a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'.[3] The author has not been able to reduce this expression any further and thus concludes that the conference of difference is the process primitive of existence. For instance, whether we infer the condition of an elementary particle as a discrete corpuscle, a quantum wave packet, or an excitation of a field, each can only realize via the process primitive: the conference of difference. The fundamental implication is that the 'conference of difference' is not a property of any single physical theory, but the universal constant expression of existence itselfâone through which every abstracta (construct) is revealed and every existent is transformed. The CoD model asserts that the conference of difference is not only universally observable throughout existence and thus in 1:1 correlation with existence but is the root process of transformation itself and thus cause to all existence.[4]
IV. Comparison
The OMAF assessment identifies a fundamental divergence between the Thomistic model and the CoD, centering on three core criteria.
Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence
- Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a radical divergence on what is ontologically primary.
- Thomistic Position: For Aquinas, primacy belongs to Ipsum Esse SubsistensâGod as Subsistent Being. This is a singular, self-sufficient entity whose very nature is existence. All other beings are secondary, their existence not self-inherent but received and participated. Existence is a gift from a primary, transcendent Source.[5]
- CoD's Position: The CoD posits that the primary reality is not a being, but a process: the conference of difference. Existence itself is this dynamic, relational activity. There is no prior, simple entity from which relation emanates; relation is the foundational condition. As stated in the Gospel of Being: All existence is a conference of difference (Koan 10.1).
- Interpretive Analysis: This difference is not merely technical but foundational. Where Thomism posits a supreme Entity as primary, the CoD's insistence on a relational process allows it to account for the inherent dynamism and interdependence of the cosmos as fundamental, not as a secondary characteristic of derivative beings. The CoD sees the world as a native network of relations, whereas Thomism sees a network of beings dependent on a single, non-relational source.
Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence
- Statement: The models offer contrasting visions of how beings exist and persist.
- Thomistic Position: In Thomism, a being's manner-of-existence is defined by the stable composition of its essence and its act of existence (esse). While beings undergo accidental change, their fundamental identity is rooted in this static essential form. Godâs manner-of-existence is one of perfect, immutable actuality.
- CoD's Position: For the CoD, manner-of-existence is inherently dynamic and transformative where all existence transforms via binding, not freedom (Koan 30.7). To be is to be engaged in the continuous work of conferencing, of transforming the condition of bearing apart into bearing together. Being is a verbâan action to be (Koan 70.1).
- Interpretive Analysis: Where Thomism offers a metaphysics of stable substances, the CoD proposes a metaphysics of perpetual process. The Thomistic view can struggle to fully account for radical change and becoming as anything other than the actualization of pre-existing potential. The CoD, by contrast, frames transformation itself as the core ontological event, making flux and relation the very stuff of reality.
Criterion 3: Relationship-Between-Multiplicity-and-Unity
- Statement: This is the locus of the most significant philosophical confrontation between the two models.
- Thomistic Position: In Thomism, unity is ontologically and logically prior. God is absolute simplicity and unity. Multiplicity arises through the 'falling short' of absolute unity, as diverse essences receive existence in limited ways. The unity observed in the world is a reflection of its shared source and the order imposed by divine wisdom.[6]
- CoD's Position: The CoD inverts this relationship. Multiplicity (difference) and unity (conference) are co-primordial and mutually constitutive. Without difference, there is nothing to relate to; without relation, no potential for transformationâno being (Koan 100.6). Unity is not a prior state from which things emanate, but an achievement of the condition of bearing together of difference itself.
- Interpretive Analysis: This is the conceptual leap that changes everything. The Thomistic model must explain how multiplicity emerges from a perfectly simple unity, a classic philosophical difficulty. The CoD sidesteps this problem entirely by positing that the relational dynamic between multiplicity and unity is the irreducible starting point. It demonstrates that an ontology can be grounded and coherent without being monistic and static, instead embracing a dynamic pluralism where unity is continually forged through relation, not presupposed by it.
V. Implications
The central insight from this comparison is that the CoD provides a framework for understanding reality as inherently relational, without a transcendent anchor â a commitment thrown into sharpest relief by confrontation with Thomistic metaphysics. Where Aquinas's system requires a logical terminus in a supreme Being, the CoD finds its explanatory ground in the constant expression of existence itself: the conference of difference.
This comparison strengthens the case for the CoD by showcasing its ability to solve a persistent problem in classical metaphysics: the emergence of the many from the One. The CoD posits that there never was a 'One' in the Thomistic senseâonly the perpetual, generative conference of difference that gives rise to unities and multiplicities simultaneously. This opens a new line of inquiry into metaphysics as a science of relations rather than substances. It sets the stage for a comparison, perhaps with a process philosopher like Whitehead, by establishing the CoD as a robust, non-theistic ontology of dynamic becoming, ready to engage with other models that prioritize change and relation over static being.
The Gospel of Being
by John Mackay
Discover the first principle of existence in 30 seconds.
Discover the bookFootnotes
The assumed distinction is not real. It is a grammatical habit mistaken for an ontological discovery. The distinction between essence ('what a thing is') and existence ('that a thing is') collapses upon inspection: to speak of a 'what' is already to presuppose something that has that nature; to speak of a 'that' is already to presuppose a 'what' that exists. As Gilbert Ryle argued in Systematically Misleading Expressions (1931), such distinctions commit the fallacy of treating abstract nouns as if they named components of reality. Here, 'essence' and 'existence' become reified as two things rather than two ways of speaking about the same concrete individual. Aquinas, unlike later scholastics, was aware of this risk but his essence/esse distinction remains grammatically hostage to the very nouns he hoped to transcend. â©ïž
The unresolved tension in Actus Purus: Aquinas writes: 'God is pure act, without any potentiality' (ST I, q. 3, a. 1, c.). Yet he also writes: 'Esse is the act of essence, just as running is the act of a runner' (SCG I, ch. 22). A runner running is incomplete until the run ceases â but God's act cannot cease. Aquinas defines esse as act (dynamic, incomplete in itself, requiring a subject). Yet he calls God Ipsum Esse Subsistens â subsistent act, complete, lacking nothing. But an act that is complete is no longer acting; it is finished. This suggests either (a) 'act' is said analogically of God and creatures in a way that empties it of dynamism, or (b) the notion of a perfect being is incompatible with esse as act. The latter option remains unexplored in Thomist philosophy. â©ïž
Note the set notation $\lbrace\rbrace$ here is adapted to mean conference with the Delta symbol $\Delta$ denoting difference. Additionally, every difference is itself a conference of difference. â©ïž
To be elaborated on in Section 4.1 The CoD as a Universal Constant. â©ïž
See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 44, a. 1. â©ïž
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 47, a. 1. â©ïž