David Lewis (1986)
A comparative analysis with the CoD
I. Abstract
David Lewis’s core ontological claim is a radical pluralism: a plurality of concrete, causally isolated possible worlds exist, each as real as our own. As mentioned in Methodology, this chapter employs the Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF) to conduct a systematic comparison between Lewis’s modal realism and the Conference of Difference (CoD) model. The OMAF reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity. For Lewis, unity is an intra-world phenomenon, with each world being a maximal spatiotemporally interrelated individual; the multiverse itself is a disconnected plurality. The CoD, in contrast, posits that unity and multiplicity are co-constitutive within a single, dynamic relational process. This highlights the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground relationality without a prior, static unity, treating existence itself as an ongoing conference. This comparison demonstrates the CoD’s unique solution to the problem of the one and the many, contributing to the thesis that the CoD offers a more dynamic and integrated foundation for ontology.
II. Overview of David Lewis's Modal Realism
Developed in the latter half of the 20th century, David Lewis's modal realism is a systematic attempt to ground our talk of possibility and necessity. Its core principle is that what we call 'the actual world' is just one among a vast, non-enumerated plurality of equally real, concrete possible worlds. These worlds are not abstract descriptions but maximal spatiotemporally interconnected wholes—each internally unified by its own spatiotemporal relations, but entirely devoid of spatiotemporal or causal connection to any other world. The key mechanism is counterpart theory: an object in our world is not literally identical to an object in another world. Instead, it has 'counterparts' in other worlds—entities that resemble it closely enough in important context-dependent respects. When we say 'Humphrey could have won the election', we mean that in some other world, a counterpart of Humphrey wins.
In the David Lewis: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:
- On primacy-of-existence, the entire pluriverse is the fundamental, unanalyzable given; it 'just is'.
- On manner-of-existence, each world is a concrete, static four-dimensional manifold.
- On the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity is stark: each world is a unified cosmos, but the totality of all worlds is a disconnected plurality, a 'bloated universe' lacking any overarching unity or relational structure. The unity is local (within worlds), while the multiplicity is global (between worlds).[1]
III. Overview of the CoD
The Conference of Difference (CoD) model claims that, as a 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. This condition: 'process of declaring together' can itself be described as a conference of difference: a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Logically, every conference is of difference as every difference is born of conference. Critically, this is not a causal circle but a constitutive one: neither term precedes the other; each is intelligible only through the other.[2] Therefore, the conference of difference is irreducible in and of itself and thus the process primitive of existence.
In the Conference of Difference: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:
- On primacy-of-existence: The CoD reveals primacy, not in substance of entities but, in the relational process itself: the conference of difference—relation precedes relata. Entities' are discerned as stabilized patterns within this ongoing process. As declared in Koan 10.1, 'all existence is a conference of difference'. Relation is not something that happens between discerned entities but rather the process primitive that transforms existence itself.
- On manner-of-existence: The manner-of-existence is fundamentally conferential and transformative. Thus, being: 'action to be' is a continuous, dynamic process of 'bearing together' and 'bearing apart' – a constant negotiation that defines the 'condition of being' that is existence. 'All existence transforms via binding, not freedom' (Koan 30.7).
- On the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity: Unity is an immanent and continuous achievement of the conference of difference itself. Koan 80.1 frames this as a universal reciprocity that moves toward equilibrium—a self-organizing principle inherent to existence itself.
IV. Comparison
Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence
- Statement: A meaningful convergence emerges regarding the fundamentality of existence, though the conclusions drawn are opposite.
- Lewis's Position: Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. The entire pluriverse, in all its plurality, is the fundamental, unanalyzable brute fact. It requires no further explanation or grounding in a more primary substance or principle. To ask 'why is there this pluriverse?' is, for Lewis, a question without an answer.
- CoD's Position: Similarly, the CoD posits the 'conference of difference' as the irreducible primitive of existence. It is the 'condition of being' itself, for which no prior cause or substance is posited.
- Interpretive Analysis: Here we see a shared philosophical concern—the rejection of infinite regress and the search for an ontological bedrock. However, they identify different bedrocks. Lewis’s is a static, pluralistic fact (the pluriverse 'is'), while the CoD’s is a dynamic, relational process (the conference 'does'). This convergence on the need for a primitive, followed by a radical divergence on its nature, throws their respective characters into sharpest relief: a static multiverse versus a dynamic, self-differencing unity.
Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence
- Statement: The OMAF assessment identifies a profound divergence on the fundamental character of what exists.
- Lewis's Position: For Lewis, the manner-of-existence is static and indexical. Each possible world is a four-dimensional block universe, a vast but fixed arrangement of objects and properties. 'Actuality' is not a metaphysically privileged status but an indexical concept, like 'here'; our world is 'actual' only to us, its inhabitants. The pluriverse is a static landscape of these complete, unchanging cosmic blocks.[3]
- CoD's Position: The CoD posits a dynamic and processual manner-of-existence. Existence is not a state but a continuous 'action to be', a perpetual process of transformation. The 'conference of difference' is not a static structure but an active 'declaring together', a continuous negotiation that is the process of being itself.
- Interpretive Analysis: This difference is not merely a preference for process over stasis but a foundational disagreement on the nature of reality. Where Lewis offers a museum of finished cosmoses, the CoD describes a single, unfinished workshop. Lewis's static blocks elegantly solve logical problems of modality but at the cost of a 'frozen' multiverse. The CoD’s dynamic process inherently accounts for change, emergence, and the open-endedness of reality as we experience it, phenomena Lewis's model must relegate to the internal dynamics of each isolated block.
Criterion 3: Relationship-Between-Multiplicity-and-Unity
- Statement: The most significant philosophical confrontation occurs over how the models reconcile the one and the many.
- Lewis's Position: Lewis’s model presents a stark dichotomy. Unity is achieved within each possible world through maximal spatiotemporal interrelation. Multiplicity exists between these worlds, which are fundamentally isolated and disconnected. The pluriverse is thus a disunified collection of unified cosmoi. There is no relation, no 'conference', that bridges the gap between worlds; they are 'island universes' in the strictest sense.
- CoD's Position: The CoD radically rejects this separation. Multiplicity (difference) and unity (conference) are not assigned to different ontological levels but are co-constitutive. The 'condition of bearing apart' (difference) and the 'condition of bearing together' (conference) are two sides of the same existential coin. Unity is not a pre-established condition of a cosmos but is actively generated and transformed through the ongoing conference of differences.
- Interpretive Analysis: This is the conceptual leap that changes everything. Lewis’s model purchases clarity at the price of fragmentation, creating a reality whose parts are fundamentally alien to one another. The CoD, by making relationality primitive, offers a deeply integrated vision. Think of it not as a collection of isolated rooms, but as a single, dynamic network where every node is defined by its connections. The CoD’s approach allows it to ground modality not in a proliferation of actualities, but in the inherent potentiality of a single, relational reality where 'what could be' is a function of the possible conferences within the one dynamic whole.[4]
V. Implications
The central insight from comparing Lewis's modal realism with the CoD is that an ontology can account for radical possibility without resorting to metaphysical fragmentation. Lewis’s genius was to take possibility seriously by literalizing it, but the cost was a pluriverse devoid of internal relation—a 'world of islands, but no sea'. The CoD, in contrast, demonstrates that a grounded and coherent ontology can be built on dynamic relationality itself, where possibility is the inherent potential of a single, conferencing reality.
This comparison further reveals a decisive epistemic advantage for the CoD. Lewis's modal realism fails the OMAF criterion of evidential grounding because his possible worlds are neither directly nor indirectly observable, nor causally accessible. His defense—that we believe in unobservable scientific entities like quarks and black holes—collapses under scrutiny: those entities are empirically confirmed through causal effects, whereas Lewis's worlds are defined as causally isolated. The CoD, in contrast, grounds its ontology in the immediate, experiential process of conferential relationality—which is not only observable but is the very condition of observation itself. This epistemic asymmetry underscores the CoD's superior coherence as an ontological framework.
This strengthens the case for the CoD by showcasing its capacity to solve a core problem that Lewis's model creates: the problem of absolute isolation. The CoD offers a more parsimonious and integrated foundation, where the generative power of difference replaces the inflationary postulate of infinite concrete worlds. It opens a new line of inquiry into modality as an expression of immanent potential within a relational field, rather than as a choice between pre-existing, disconnected totalities. This sets the stage for examining models that, unlike Lewis's, attempt to ground dynamism and relation within a single world, challenging the CoD to distinguish its process-based unity from other monistic frameworks.
Footnotes
Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, 1986. ↩︎
Just as the decimal system (relation) is prior to the number 7 (relatum), though each is intelligible only through the other. The system does not depend on any single numeral, but no numeral exists outside a system. ↩︎
Ibid. ↩︎
This aligns with the CoD's view that 'the 'future' is a present-moment projection of potential', not a separate reality. ↩︎