David Lewis (1986)

A comparative analysis with the CoD

...
For first-time readers: This comparative analysis assumes familiarity with the Conference of Difference (CoD) ontological model. For a concise introduction to its central claim, see Central claim

I. Abstract

David Lewis’s core ontological claim is a radical pluralism: a plurality of concrete, causally isolated possible worlds exist, each as real as our own. As mentioned in Methodology, this chapter employs the Ontological Model Assessment Framework (OMAF) to conduct a systematic comparison between Lewis’s modal realism and the Conference of Difference (CoD) model. The OMAF reveals a fundamental divergence on the criterion of the relationship-between-multiplicity-and-unity. For Lewis, unity is an intra-world phenomenon, with each world being a maximal spatiotemporally interrelated individual; the multiverse itself is a disconnected plurality. The CoD, in contrast, posits that unity and multiplicity are co-constitutive within a single, dynamic relational process. This highlights the CoD's distinctive capacity to ground relationality without a prior, static unity, treating existence itself as an ongoing conference. This comparison demonstrates the CoD’s unique solution to the problem of the one and the many, contributing to the thesis that the CoD offers a more dynamic and integrated foundation for ontology.

II. Overview of David Lewis's Modal Realism

Developed in the latter half of the 20th century, David Lewis's modal realism is a systematic attempt to ground our talk of possibility and necessity. Its core principle is that what we call 'the actual world' is just one among a vast, non-enumerated plurality of equally real, concrete possible worlds. These worlds are not abstract descriptions but maximal spatiotemporally interconnected wholes—each internally unified by its own spatiotemporal relations, but entirely devoid of spatiotemporal or causal connection to any other world. The key mechanism is counterpart theory: an object in our world is not literally identical to an object in another world. Instead, it has 'counterparts' in other worlds—entities that resemble it closely enough in important context-dependent respects. When we say 'Humphrey could have won the election', we mean that in some other world, a counterpart of Humphrey wins.

In the David Lewis: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

III. Overview of the CoD

The Conference of Difference (CoD) model claims that, as a 'condition of being', existence is, by extension, a 'process of declaring together of action to be'. This condition: 'process of declaring together' can itself be described as a conference of difference: a 'condition of bearing together' transforming the 'condition of bearing apart'. Logically, every conference is of difference as every difference is born of conference. Critically, this is not a causal circle but a constitutive one: neither term precedes the other; each is intelligible only through the other.[2] Therefore, the conference of difference is irreducible in and of itself and thus the process primitive of existence.

In the Conference of Difference: a CRUP-OMAF case study, its ontology is assessed as follows:

IV. Comparison

Criterion 1: Primacy-of-Existence

Criterion 2: Manner-of-Existence

Criterion 3: Relationship-Between-Multiplicity-and-Unity

V. Implications

The central insight from comparing Lewis's modal realism with the CoD is that an ontology can account for radical possibility without resorting to metaphysical fragmentation. Lewis’s genius was to take possibility seriously by literalizing it, but the cost was a pluriverse devoid of internal relation—a 'world of islands, but no sea'. The CoD, in contrast, demonstrates that a grounded and coherent ontology can be built on dynamic relationality itself, where possibility is the inherent potential of a single, conferencing reality.

This comparison further reveals a decisive epistemic advantage for the CoD. Lewis's modal realism fails the OMAF criterion of evidential grounding because his possible worlds are neither directly nor indirectly observable, nor causally accessible. His defense—that we believe in unobservable scientific entities like quarks and black holes—collapses under scrutiny: those entities are empirically confirmed through causal effects, whereas Lewis's worlds are defined as causally isolated. The CoD, in contrast, grounds its ontology in the immediate, experiential process of conferential relationality—which is not only observable but is the very condition of observation itself. This epistemic asymmetry underscores the CoD's superior coherence as an ontological framework.

This strengthens the case for the CoD by showcasing its capacity to solve a core problem that Lewis's model creates: the problem of absolute isolation. The CoD offers a more parsimonious and integrated foundation, where the generative power of difference replaces the inflationary postulate of infinite concrete worlds. It opens a new line of inquiry into modality as an expression of immanent potential within a relational field, rather than as a choice between pre-existing, disconnected totalities. This sets the stage for examining models that, unlike Lewis's, attempt to ground dynamism and relation within a single world, challenging the CoD to distinguish its process-based unity from other monistic frameworks.

The Gospel of Being cover

The Gospel of Being

by John Mackay

Discover the first principle of existence in 30 seconds.

Discover the book
The Gospel of Being cover

The Gospel of Being

by John Mackay

Discover the first principle of existence in 30 seconds.

Discover the book


Footnotes

  1. Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, 1986. ↩︎

  2. Just as the decimal system (relation) is prior to the number 7 (relatum), though each is intelligible only through the other. The system does not depend on any single numeral, but no numeral exists outside a system. ↩︎

  3. Ibid. ↩︎

  4. This aligns with the CoD's view that 'the 'future' is a present-moment projection of potential', not a separate reality. ↩︎


License: JIML v.1